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INTRODUCTION 
in taxes” have a long history in alcohol and tobacco policy.1 
The need to generate revenues in the wake of harsh economic 
circumstances was reportedly an important motivation not only for 
repealing national alcohol prohibition in 1933, but also for states 
rolling back earlier, state-level prohibitions after fiscal crunches 
brought on by the Civil War and the Panic of 1893.2 Revenue 
arguments have also figured prominently in the liberalization of state 
gambling laws, and alcohol and tobacco taxes are widely recognized 
as powerful tools for advancing public health interests, even apart 
from their fiscal benefits.3 
In keeping with this tradition, potential tax rates and revenues have 
been a prominent theme in discussions about legalizing marijuana.4 
State agencies have produced fiscal impact analyses—some featuring 
fairly large projected revenue numbers—to inform voters about 
	
1 See DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES OF HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 155–56 (2001). 
2 Emily Greene Owens, Are Underground Markets Really More Violent? Evidence 
from Early 20th Century America, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011). 
3 Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control Strategy, 21 
TOBACCO CONTROL 172, 179 (2012); Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., Effects of Alcohol 
Tax and Price Policies on Morbidity and Mortality: A Systematic Review, 100 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 2270, 2277 (2010). 
4 We primarily use the informal “marijuana” rather than the scientific term “cannabis” 
because the most active movements to regulate and tax are in North America, where 
“marijuana” is the more common term. See, e.g., KENNETH W. CLEMENTS, & XUEYAN 
ZHAO, ECONOMICS AND MARIJUANA: CONSUMPTION, PRICING AND LEGALISATION 
(2009), available at http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/84952/frontmatter/97805218 
84952_frontmatter.pdf; JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, THE BUDGETARY 
IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/sites 
/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf; Michael R. Caputo & Brian J. Ostrom, 
Potential Tax Revenue from a Regulated Marijuana Market: A Meaningful Revenue 
Source, 53 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 475 (1994); Jon Gettman, Lost Taxes and Other Costs of 
Marijuana Laws, BULL. CANNABIS REFORM, Oct. 2007, at 1 available at http://www.drug 
science.org/Archive/bcr4/Lost%20Taxes%20and%20Other%20Costs%20of%20Marijuana
%20Laws.pdf; Jeffrey A. Miron, The Effect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices: Evidence 
from the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 522 (2003); Dale 
Gieringer, Benefits of Marijuana Legalization in California, CAL. NORML (Oct. 2009), 
http://canorml.org/background/CA_legalization2.html. 
 For good reviews of broader legalization issues, see MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, 
MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL (Contributions in Criminology and 
Penology No. 22, 1989); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: 
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES (2001); and ROBIN ROOM ET AL., 
CANNABIS POLICY: MOVING BEYOND THE STALEMATE (2010). 
“S
CAULKINS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  1:47 PM 
2013] High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from Legal Cannabis 1043 
proposed laws and ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana.5 Most 
discussion has focused on revenue estimation, analysis of likely post-
legalization prices compared to current illicit prices, and the questions 
of evasion through “gray” and “black” markets.6 This Article seeks to 
broaden the revenue discussion about marijuana legalization with 
respect to policy goals, types of taxes, and components of revenue. 
However, this Article does not attempt a societal benefit-cost 
analysis. Nor does it reach any ultimate conclusion about whether 
legalization is desirable on balance. 
This analysis is particularly timely because in November 2012, 
voters in two U.S. states, Colorado and Washington, approved 
propositions legalizing commercial production and distribution of 
non-medical marijuana for profit,7 and other states may follow suit. 
Legislators in Rhode Island and Hawaii introduced bills to legalize 
marijuana in 2013,8 and activists are already planning ballot 
initiatives for upcoming elections. There are also proposals to legalize 
marijuana at the federal level, but these appear to be unlikely to pass 
in the near future.9 So at least for a time, all marijuana-related activity 
is likely to remain prohibited by the federal Controlled Substances 
Act.10 
	
5 See, e.g., CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, STAFF LEGISLATIVE BILL ANALYSIS: 
AB 390 (2009), available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/ab0390-1dw-revisedrev.pdf 
(analyzing AB 390, a bill introduced on February 23, 2009, which would impose a fee on 
marijuana sales); WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., I-502 WORKSHEET (2012), 
available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/initiatives/2012/I-502_Worksheet.pdf (detailing the 
financial impact of Washington’s Initiative 502, which would regulate the production and 
distribution of marijuana). 
6 “Black” markets involve purely illicit production and distribution: for example, 
ordinary drug trafficking, sale of forbidden sexual services, or counterfeit goods. In “gray” 
markets, product is diverted from legal channels, often for tax or regulatory arbitrage, as 
when cigarettes bought on Native American reservations or in low-tax states are resold in 
high-tax states or alcohol purchased legally by adults is illegally resold to minors. 
7 Keith Coffman & Nicole Neroulias, Colorado, Washington First States to Legalize 
Recreational Pot, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2012, 4:43 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012 
/11/07/us-usa-marijuana-legalization-idUSBRE8A602D20121107. 
8 Marijuana Regulation, Control, and Taxation Act, H. 2013-5274, Jan. Sess., at 1 (R.I. 
2013), available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText/BillText13/HouseText13 
/H5274.pdf; H. 27-699, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Haw. 2013), available at http://www.capitol 
.hawaii.gov/session2013/bills/HB699_.pdf. 
9 Raju Chebium, Bills Take Aim at Federal Marijuana Ban, USA TODAY (Mar. 14, 
2013, 10:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/03/14/marijuana       
-legalization-congress/1988131/. 
10 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801–971 (West, Westlaw through 
2013 legislation)). A publicly available online version of this Act is available at Controlled 
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Agencies in both Washington and Colorado now face the 
unprecedented task of designing regulatory regimes for legal 
marijuana, or perhaps more accurately “quasi-legal” marijuana given 
the ongoing federal prohibition. Since the consequences of state-level 
legalization will depend on these states’ policies, how they are 
enforced, and the federal response, federal officials designing that 
response may want to consider tax-related issues. For example, if 
federal enforcement shuts down Colorado and Washington’s 
“regulate-and-tax” approach, other states might respond by passing 
“repeal-only” forms of legalization,11 which could exacerbate post-
legalization increases in marijuana use and abuse through their 
absence of regulations and taxes.12 
However, the movement of public opinion with respect to 
marijuana might ultimately lead to national-level legalization, or at 
least make passive acceptance by the federal government a politically 
feasible response to state measures. Meanwhile, other countries, 
notably Uruguay, have already entertained serious discussions about 
legalizing marijuana at the national level.13 
This Article is divided into two Parts. Part I addresses excise 
taxes,14 and Part II addresses other ways a legalized industry could 
produce government revenue. In both Parts the goal is to identify 
conceptual issues and provide a framework for thinking about 
revenues. However, the goal is not to provide specific revenue 
estimates, which naturally depend on the particulars of the law and 
impossible-to-predict-at-present aspects of the federal response to 
these laws.15 
	
Substances Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation 
/legislation/ucm148726.htm (last updated June 11, 2009). 
11 A “repeal-only” approach would mean simply ending state-level marijuana 
prohibition, as New York ended its version of the Volstead Act in 1923. By contrast, under 
a “regulate-and-tax” approach, the state tries to substitute regulations and taxes for 
prohibition. Ironically, “regulate-and-tax” is more vulnerable to federal intervention than 
the more radical “repeal-only.” 
12 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: Lessons from the 2012 State 
Proposals, WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y, Dec. 2012, at 4, 18–19. 
13 Jonathan Gilbert, Uruguay Takes ‘War on Drugs’ in New Direction: The State as 
Dealer, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World 
/Americas/2012/0919/Uruguay-takes-war-on-drugs-in-new-direction-The-state-as-dealer. 
14 An excise tax is a tax that is paid when a specific good or service is purchased (e.g., 
alcohol, gasoline, etc.). 
15 For example, this Article neither addresses nor speculates about the enforcement of 
section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, which “disallows deductions incurred in the 
trade or business of trafficking in controlled substances that federal law or the law of any 
state in which the taxpayer conducts the business prohibits.” Letter from Andrew J. Keyso, 
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I 
EXCISE TAXES 
A. Standard Analysis of Potential Revenue 
A relatively simple analysis of excise-tax revenues16 starts with 
some estimate of national consumption, scales that down to the state 
level (often using state-specific prevalence estimates from the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health17), guesses at a post-
legalization price, adjusts current consumption levels based on an 
estimated price-elasticity of demand,18 and computes a price-decline-
driven expansion in consumption. Consumption estimates may or 
may not then be bumped up further to reflect non-price effects of 
legalization on use.19 
More sophisticated approaches consider the possibility that the 
elasticity over a large legalization-induced price change might not 
match the elasticity measured over the relatively small price changes 
under prohibition that underpin empirical estimates.20 An analysis 
might also adjust for untaxed sales and use because of home growing, 
gray-market tax evasion, untaxed medical-marijuana purchases, 
and/or black-market purchases.21 For example, minors, forbidden to 
buy marijuana under current and most proposed legalization schemes, 
account for a substantial share of total purchases.22 Under 
	
Deputy Assoc. Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., to Fortney Pete Stark, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/11              
-0005.pdf (on file with the Internal Revenue Service). 
16 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STIFFLER, COLO. CTR. ON LAW & POLICY, AMENDMENT 64 
WOULD PRODUCE $60 MILLION IN NEW REVENUE AND SAVINGS FOR COLORADO (2012), 
available at http://www.cclponline.org/postfiles/amendment_64_analysis_final.pdf. 
17 State Estimates of Substance Use and Mental Disorders from the 2010–2011 
NSDUHs: Table of Contents, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 
samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k11State/NSDUHsaeTOC2011.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
18 The price elasticity of demand is a concept in economics that describes how 
responsive the quantity purchased of a good or service is to its price. 
19 See Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating the Non-Price Effects of Legalization on 
Cannabis Consumption 8 (RAND, Working Paper No. WR-767-RC, 2010), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2010/RAND_WR767.pdf. 
20 See, e.g., BEAU KILMER ET AL., ALTERED STATE? ASSESSING HOW MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION IN CALIFORNIA COULD INFLUENCE MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION AND 
PUBLIC BUDGETS 27–31 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs 
/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP315.pdf. 
21 Id. at 15–16, 29, 48. 
22 The rate is likely on the order of thirty percent, based on our analysis of data from 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2011, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH 
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legalization, minors might be supplied by illegal growers (or untaxed 
diversion from legal production) or—like minors obtaining alcohol—
by repurchase from adult customers of the legal supply system. The 
relative frequency of those two phenomena will have an important 
impact on revenues. 
The quantity and spending estimates are multiplied by the relevant 
tax rates. Specific excise taxes are assessed per unit weight (e.g., fifty 
dollars per ounce). Ad valorem taxes are assessed as a percentage of 
the selling price, like most familiar sales taxes. Adding in estimated 
sales-tax receipts then produces a final revenue estimate. 
Some published estimates start with unrealistic estimates of current 
consumption, neglect to consider the possibility that prices will 
decline, or fail to adjust for changes in the mix of types of cannabis 
used.23 Currently, Mexican commercial-grade marijuana accounts for 
a considerable share of the market by weight, but higher potency 
product might dominate after legalization.24 So the number of ounces 
consumed per hour of intoxication might fall considerably, perhaps by 
a factor of two; this would have sharp consequences for specific (but 
not ad valorem) excise-tax revenues.25 
Few estimates account for product proliferation or bundling; they 
imagine that most marijuana will continue to be sold loose or in 
joints. But if marijuana were priced as a loss-leader26 in a bundle with 
other goods or services, that might erode retail-level excise-tax 
revenues. For example, if a marijuana “bar” set low, per-joint prices 
and derived most of its revenue from a cover or entertainment charge, 
then there would be less excise-tax revenues.27 
	
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SAMHDA/studies/34481 (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
23 For example, the Washington State Department of Revenue assumes an average of 
two grams consumed per day of use and that prices will remain around twelve dollars per 
gram. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., Individual State Agency Fiscal Note: Request 
078-3, in FISCAL NOTE PACKAGE FOR I-502: AN ACT RELATING TO MARIJUANA 26–27, 
available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/initiatives/2012/I-502.pdf (located on pages 3–4 of 
Request 078-3). 
24 KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 21; BEAU KILMER ET AL., REDUCING DRUG 
TRAFFICKING REVENUES AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: WOULD LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 
IN CALIFORNIA HELP? 22–24 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam 
/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf. 
25 Id. at 20–21. 
26 “Loss leader” is a term of art in retail that refers to a product sold at less than cost in 
order to attract customers to buy other products sold at a profit. 
27 Apparently “cabaret taxes” from World War II set a precedent for taxing all goods 
sold by a particular type of specialized establishment, suggesting a way around this issue, 
but not without possible other concerns. Cf., Eric Felten, Op-Ed, How the Taxman Cleared 
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B. The Revenue Potential of a Legal Marijuana Market 
Nationwide legalization could presumably generate significant tax 
revenues if the legalization were designed with that objective in 
mind.28 Marijuana users currently spend on the order of $30 billion 
per year on marijuana.29 Production costs if professional farmers were 
allowed to grow marijuana would be quite small.30 Yields are likely 
to be somewhere in the vicinity of 500 to 1,000 pounds per acre of 
high-potency marijuana or its equivalent.31 This implies that less than 
10,000 acres could supply as much intoxicating power as the entire 
current illicit market, at a cost of perhaps $5,000 to $20,000 per 
acre.32 That suggests total post-legalization production costs for 
“generic” high-potency marijuana on the order of $100 million, or 
something like $20 per pound, which is about one percent of the 
current amount paid to illicit marijuana growers in the United 
States.33 
Presumably there would be niche markets for hand-grown, 
specialty, and organic varieties of marijuana. Likewise, there would 
be processing and distribution costs, but these costs would likely be 
low. For example, tobacco-processing costs are less than one dollar 
per pound, and the total weight of the material is small (about 5,000 
tons), so the physical costs of packaging and transporting would not 
be large. By comparison Americans consume about 7,000,000 tons of 
fresh and processed apples each year. 
In sum, customers value marijuana in the tens of billions of dollars, 
and modern industrial farming and distribution can supply that 
demand for hundreds of millions of dollars. Zeros matter; effectively, 
most of the $30 billion or so consumers are willing to pay is available 
to be captured as profits and/or taxes—but only if competitive 
pressure does not drive prices down. Since the quantity of marijuana 
	
the Dance Floor, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323628804578348050712410108.html?mod=hp_opinion. 
28 Pat Oglesby, Gangs, Ganjapreneurs, or Government: Marijuana Revenue Up for 
Grabs, 66 ST. TAX NOTES 255, 263 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2165864. 
29 BEAU KILMER ET AL., WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLICIT DRUGS: 2000–
2010 (forthcoming 2013) (on file with authors). 
30 JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 160 (2012). 
31 Id. at 161. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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consumers are willing to buy falls less-than-proportionally as price 
increases, then lower prices lead to lower total revenues.34 
C. Government Monopoly: Consequences and Barriers 
One way to extract those revenues would be to make the 
production and sale of marijuana a government monopoly. While, in 
theory, one can always design a tax system that reproduces whatever 
production volume and retail prices one would like to see from a 
government monopoly, practical difficulties—operational and 
political—would complicate matters. 
To maintain current marijuana prices, the tax’s value-to-weight 
ratio would have to be enormous compared to other excise taxes. In 
round terms, there is a $2,000 gap between the current wholesale 
illicit price of a pound of high-potency marijuana and its production 
cost after national legalization, but a hypothetical $2,000 per pound 
marijuana tax would equal, on a weight-equivalent basis, an $88 tax 
on a pack of cigarettes.35 Much lower taxes have generated a multi-
billion-dollar market in tax-evading cigarettes in high-tax states.36 
Such high taxes would invite evasion through gray-market diversion 
or black-market illicit production.37 The value of taxes on marijuana 
that could be carried in a duffel bag would approximate the median 
family income; a passenger car could carry marijuana with $1 million 
worth of taxes. There are currently about 40,000 people in prison with 
marijuana convictions, many of whom have other concurrent 
	
34 Craig A. Gallet, Can Price Get the Monkey Off Our Back? A Meta-analysis of Illicit 
Drug Demand, 22 HEALTH ECON. (forthcoming 2013); Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, 
Examining the Impact of Marijuana Legalization on Marijuana Consumption: Insights 
from the Economics Literature 2, 11, 17–18 (RAND, Working Paper No. WR-770-RC, 
2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2010 
/RAND_WR770.pdf. These studies summarize estimates of the price elasticity of 
marijuana under prohibition. However, the effect of higher prices on consumption in an 
illegal market might not be the same as the effect of higher prices on consumption post-
legalization. Indeed, one could speculate that the price elasticity of demand would be 
different once those who are currently deterred from breaking the law have “access” to the 
market. We do not know if this will be the case, but it provides a good reminder about the 
uncertainty associated with using data collected under prohibition to project what might 
happen once the activity is legal. 
35 $2,000 per pound * 20 grams per pack / 453.6 grams per pound = $88 per pack. 
36 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-313, ILLICIT TOBACCO: 
VARIOUS SCHEMES ARE USED TO EVADE TAXES AND FEES 14 app. 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11313.pdf. 
37 There is such diversion from legal production of opium for pharmaceutical sales. 
Letizia Paoli et al., The Global Diversion of Pharmaceutical Drugs—India: The Third 
Largest Illicit Opium Producer?, 104 ADDICTION 347, 349 (2009). 
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convictions.38 This effort consumes low-single-digit billions of 
dollars per year of enforcement resources. Thus, some fraction—
perhaps a substantial one—of the revenues derived from marijuana 
taxation might have to be spent protecting those revenues from illicit 
competition. 
Complicating matters, home production is easier for marijuana than 
for many other products subject to excise taxes. At current retail 
prices, a house fully given over to marijuana production could 
produce approximately $2 million worth of marijuana per year.39 
Even if one stays within grow-your-own allowances, one could still 
grow a lot. For example, Alaska’s right-to-privacy protects anyone 
growing fewer than twenty-five plants in a private residence.40 For-
profit distribution is illegal and could remain so even if licensed 
cultivation were legal; however, diverting the yield from growing 
twenty-four plants at a time could readily support a middle-class 
lifestyle if the taxed retail price remained near current levels. Where 
fewer plants are allowed, an enterprising individual could aggregate 
the production of five to ten friends, each of whom stays under the 
limit on plants and square footage, if the regulations are written that 
way. Entry into this kind of home production would be relatively easy 
since the information needed to operate growing is already well 
established and virtually free to access from books and online 
sources. 
A government monopoly could ease some, but not all, of these 
problems. For example, if only the government is allowed to grow 
marijuana, then anything else that is produced would clearly be 
illegal. Enforcement would be easier if possession of a marijuana 
plant or a quantity of marijuana exceeding personal-consumption 
amounts were prima facie evidence of criminal wrongdoing 
(something that could not be presumed if private citizens or 
businesses were allowed to produce). Likewise, if public officials ran 
all production and distribution facilities, then the risk of gray-market 
activity might be substantially reduced. Moreover, a public agency 
running the marijuana trade might restrict its marketing efforts in 
deference to public-health concerns, whereas the commercial free-
speech doctrine could limit the government’s ability to force private 
	
38 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 50. 
39 546 pounds * 16 ounces * $250 ounce = $2.2 million. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, 
ESTIMATED COST OF PRODUCTION FOR LEGALIZED CANNABIS 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2010/RAND_WR764.pdf. 
40 See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
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industry to do the same. A government-owned industry might also 
lack the lobbying power and incentives of a private industry, since a 
private industry would likely have a strong lobbying force for lower 
taxes and weaker regulations.41 
There are thus strong arguments for public monopoly and reasons 
to be concerned that states starting a private-industry model might get 
locked into an inferior production model, since that new industry 
could be expected to resist any attempt to convert the system to one of 
public supply.42 Alas, although government monopolies have been 
discussed—in Uruguay43 or for retail stores in Oregon’s 2012 ballot 
initiative44—this could be a non-starter from a state-level perspective 
as long as the Controlled Substances Act remains in force. 
Public monopolies also create their own set of problems. They 
might be deficient in customer service and in product selection and 
innovation—an important consideration in a newly legal market, 
where a high rate of innovation could be expected. If the monopoly 
were only on distribution and retail sale, there would be the risk of 
producers using influence and even bribery to promote their products; 
this, too, has been an issue in the alcohol trade.45 
Moreover, though a public monopoly might be more restrained in 
its marketing than a private industry, such a result is not guaranteed. 
State lotteries, for example, have been notably focused on revenue 
maximization rather than the prevention of compulsive gambling, and 
	
41 Since the industry would be economically dependent on the consumption of very 
heavy users, any successful attempt to prevent or treat “problem” marijuana use would 
constitute a threat to the industry’s well-being. The success of the alcoholic-beverage 
industries in keeping regulation weak and taxes low in real terms, in the face of strong 
public-interest arguments for higher taxes and tighter regulations, see PHILIP J. COOK, 
PAYING THE TAB: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ALCOHOL CONTROL 9–10 (2007), 
suggests the risks. These and similar considerations leave us skeptical of revenue estimates 
that casually brush aside concerns about possible gray-market tax evasion. See, e.g., 
Michael R. Caputo & Brian J. Ostrum, Potential Tax Revenue from a Regulated 
Marijuana Market: A Meaningful Revenue Source, 53 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 475 (1994); 
Gary S. Becker et al., The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs, 114 J. POL. 
ECON. 38 (2006); see also WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., supra note 5. 
42 Oglesby, supra note 28, at 267. 
43 Gilbert, supra note 13. 
44 Letter from Lydia Plukchi, Compliance Specialist, Office of the Sec’y of State, to All 
Interested Parties (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://oregonvotes.org/irr/2012/009text.pdf 
(discussing a proposed Oregon initiative petition). 
45 VICTOR J. TREMBLAY & CAROL HORTON TREMBLAY, THE U.S. BREWING 
INDUSTRY: DATA AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 247–48 (2005); see COOK, supra note 41, at 
66, 176. 
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some of their marketing efforts have been shameless to the point of 
mendacity.46 
Thus, although public monopoly has precedents in other areas and 
a number of apparent advantages over taxation and regulation, it does 
not seem likely that such a system will be adopted in the U.S. in the 
near future. 
D. The Challenge of Collecting Taxes in a Market-Based System 
If a government monopoly is unlikely, that raises the question of 
how to tax a private industry, which is something more complicated 
than one might first think (even leaving aside the considerable 
complication of an ongoing federal prohibition).47 The tax rates that 
jurisdictions contemplate vary widely. Proposals from 2012 illustrate 
the range of possibilities. New Hampshire’s Senate Bill 1775 would 
have set the tax at forty-five dollars per ounce.48 Missouri’s proposal 
would have limited taxes to no more than one hundred dollars per 
pound or about six dollars per ounce.49 One proposition considered in 
California in 2012 would have imposed no new tax and repealed the 
existing sales and excise taxes on medical marijuana.50 Three years 
earlier, California Assemblyman Tom Ammiano introduced a bill 
with a fifty dollar per ounce rate.51 
Some places with medical marijuana are currently collecting 
medical-marijuana-specific levies—for example, the city of Oakland, 
California.52 However, it is unclear how much of the medical 
marijuana consumed in these jurisdictions is subject to these taxes. In 
any case, taxes do not collect themselves, and the capacity to actually 
collect the potential revenues is dependent on regime design. If one 
	
46 CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN 
AMERICA 210 (1989); Michael Nelson, The Lottery Gamble, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 
2001), http://prospect.org/article/lottery-gamble. 
47 Mikos describes the additional challenges for tax collection created by an ongoing 
federal prohibition. See generally ROBERT A. MIKOS, STATE TAXATION OF MARIJUANA 
DISTRIBUTION AND OTHER FEDERAL CRIMES (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Public Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 10-05, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 10-04, 
2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549828 (describing the various 
challenges to collecting taxes on marijuana while it remains illegal under federal law). 
48 Caulkins et al., supra note 12, at 17. 
49 Id. 
50 Oglesby, supra note 28, at 255–56. 
51 KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at iii. 
52 Daniel B. Wood, Oakland Voters Approve Marijuana Tax, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (July 22, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2009/0722/p02s07     
-ussc.html. 
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makes revenue generation the paramount objective, this suggests a 
variety of provisions (e.g., banning home growing) that might allow 
fairly substantial revenue collection. But if tax provisions are merely 
tacked onto a regime design based on other principles (libertarianism, 
human rights, consumer convenience, etc.), the choice may be 
between relatively modest aspirations for tax revenues or unrealistic 
aspirations that are undercut by significant gray markets.53 
One approach to enforcing the rules would be requiring all 
producers and distributors to be licensed and then severely limiting 
the number of licensees. The obvious benefit is that fewer licensees 
imply fewer companies and sites to monitor and inspect. The more 
subtle benefit is that artificially restricting the number of licenses can 
make those licenses valuable. Comparison is often made to New York 
City taxicab medallions. In one 2008 auction, the minimum bid 
allowed for a corporate medallion was $700,000.54 If the state 
regulatory body can take away something valuable via the simple 
administrative action of license revocation, then powerful incentives 
to abide by the law are created. Furthermore, the licenses can be 
worth that much only if the expected revenues to a licensee are even 
greater; the opportunity cost of being expelled from the industry could 
thus be an even greater motivation to toe the line. Businesses with 
millions in annual revenues flowing from scarce licenses are less 
likely to be tempted by the opportunity to make money illegally than 
are holders of licenses that are easy to obtain and provide only meager 
profits to those who follow the rules. 
Limiting the number of licensees—giving the licenses scarcity 
value—raises the question of how to allocate those valuable 
privileges. The risks of favoritism, or even corruption, cannot be 
ignored. A solution to that problem would be to conduct an auction 
among all qualified bidders, thus appropriating the scarcity value to 
the public fisc. However, such a system would create pressure on 
every seller to maximize revenues, which means maximizing use by 
problem users. Any seller who tried to act more responsibly—from a 
	
53 See Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Design Considerations for Legalizing Cannabis: 
Lessons Inspired by Analysis of California’s Proposition 19, 107 ADDICTION 865, 868 
(2011); Caulkins et al., supra note 12, at 25. 
54 MATTHEW W. DAUS, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, INDUSTRY NOTICE 08-
04: MINIMUM BID PRICE AND IMPORTANT DATES FOR UPCOMING MEDALLION AUCTION 
(Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/industry_notice 
_08_04.pdf; Medallion Sales Information, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/medallion/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
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public-health perspective—could be outbid at the next license 
auction. 
E. What to Tax 
Choices about taxation include not only rate setting but also 
determining what to tax and via what mechanism. As mentioned 
above, proposals often specify a tax per unit weight, but the two 
propositions that passed in 2012 expressed taxes as a percent of value 
(ad valorem); that offers as a considerable advantage automatic 
indexing for inflation, whereas the real size of weight-based taxes can 
be eroded over time by inflation.55 
There are still other options.56 Massachusetts House Bill 1371 
would have taxed THC, not marijuana,57 a possibility previously 
mentioned by Robert MacCoun.58 The rate would have been ten 
dollars per percentage point of THC per ounce. For example, 
marijuana that was five percent THC by dry weight would be taxed at 
fifty dollars per ounce. Thus high-potency sinsemilla (typically ten to 
eighteen percent THC) would have been taxed at a higher rate per 
ounce than would commercial-grade marijuana that is only four to six 
percent THC. Current alcohol taxes follow this approach, albeit 
coarsely. Distilled spirits (at least twenty-four percent alcohol by 
volume) are taxed at much higher rates per unit volume than beer 
(typically less than six percent alcohol). 
One could contemplate imposing higher tax rates per unit of THC 
on products with high concentrations if one believed such products 
may be more dangerous. On the other hand, if the primary concern 
were the effects of smoked marijuana on the respiratory system, 
taxing higher potencies at lower rates could be preferred because it 
	
55 Pat Oglesby, Laws to Tax Marijuana, 59 ST. TAX NOTES 251, 262 (2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2214910. 
56 Oglesby describes how California localities have pursued a variety of other tax bases, 
including number of plants (Rancho Cordova), square feet of grow space (Berkeley and 
Long Beach), and, aimed at energy-intensive indoor grow operations, extraordinary 
electricity usage (“a 45 percent tax on electricity of residential households that exceed 600 
percent of the average residential electrical usage” in Arcata). Interview with Pat Oglesby, 
Attorney, Ctr. for New Revenue (Mar. 15, 2013). 
57 The Cannabis Regulation and Taxation Act, H. 187-1371, (Mass. 2011), available at 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H01371. 
58 However, there would be complications because of the potential imprecision of 
potency assays. See Dale Gieringer & Arno Hazekamp, How Accurate Is Potency 
Testing?, O’SHAUGHNESSY’S, Autumn 2011, at 17, available at http://www.scribd.com 
/doc/66309027/The-Ring-Test-O-Shaughnessy-s-Autumn-2011. 
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would encourage the use of higher-potency product, which involves 
inhaling fewer combustion products per hour of intoxication.59 
Still more complicated schemes could be imagined since 
marijuana, unlike ethanol, does not have just one psychoactive 
ingredient.60 Some have argued that adverse reactions (e.g., anxiety 
attacks) come not from high THC per se, but rather from high ratios 
of THC to CBD, and those ratios vary considerably.61 Caulkins and 
colleagues note that one California dispensary sells strains of 
marijuana whose THC to CBD ratio varies from 1:2 to 100:1.62 This 
suggests the possibility of using more complicated taxing strategies to 
nudge the market to less harmful forms of the drug.63 For example, a 
state could tax marijuana with a higher THC to CBD ratio at a higher 
rate. Such ideas would be similar in spirit to Chaloupka’s proposal to 
use differential tax rates to incentivize “smokers” (more broadly, 
nicotine users) to switch to modes of administration that pose fewer 
health risks.64 For example, snus65 might be taxed at a lower rate than 
traditional chewing tobacco. Likewise, e-cigarettes could be taxed at a 
lower rate than traditional cigarettes. 
It is clear that tax changes can influence market share between 
similar products. The U.S. Government Accountability Office report 
describes this for roll-your-own versus pipe tobacco.66 Before April 
2009, both were taxed at $1.0969 per pound. Then roll-your-own 
taxes were increased to $24.78 per pound, while pipe tobacco taxes 
increased to only $2.8311 per pound. Pipe tobacco’s share of the 
combined forms promptly rose from 12.9% to 65%. Other similar tax 
	
59 While most marijuana consumed today is smoked, there are other methods of 
delivery—for example, edibles and teas. Vaporizers also allow marijuana to be heated and 
inhaled without many of the impurities that come from burning and smoking it. 
60 See JANET ELIZABETH JOY ET AL., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE 
SCIENCE BASE 25 (1999). 
61 Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol, usually referred to as THC, is the primary intoxicating 
agent in marijuana smoke. Id. Cannabidiol (CBD) is another of the dozens of cannabinoid 
chemicals in the plant, and appears to “buffer” the effects of THC, including anxiety and 
the risk of panic attacks. Id. at 25, 36. 
62 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 157. 
63 Since we are still learning about cannabinoids and how they interact, one may want 
to design a tax regime that can be easily amended to incorporate new insights. See 
Caulkins et al., supra note 53, at 868; Caulkins et al., supra note 12, at 30–31. 
64 Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control Strategy, 21 
TOBACCO CONTROL 172, 174 (2012). 
65 Snus is a form of tobacco that is not fire-cured, so it is much less carcinogenic. 
66 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 13. 
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changes at the same time knocked small cigars’ share of the cigar 
market from 52.5% down to 11.3%.67 
However, social engineering by manipulating tax rates could be 
controversial. It is difficult to analyze and debate publicly the relative 
risks of different forms of tobacco consumption.68 Similarly, while 
junk-food taxes exist (e.g., in Hungary), they have not always been an 
easy sell politically.69 
Marijuana-infused beverages and edibles raise additional issues. 
They may be intrinsically more dangerous because the delay between 
consumption and onset of effects makes it harder to adjust (“titrate”) 
the dose to achieve only the desired effect.70 In addition, some edibles 
(candies, in particular) may be problematic if they are tempting to 
minors. However, if edibles and beverages were taxed by weight at 
nominally the same rate, then that might translate into a considerably 
higher rate per unit of intoxication. For example, a marijuana-infused 
brownie weighs a lot more than the marijuana it contains. Even on ad 
valorem grounds, the marijuana-infused brownie or gummy candy 
might sell for more than the marijuana alone, particularly if it were 
sold at a café to be consumed on premises. 
The challenge of defining equivalent tax rates was raised directly 
by California’s Regulate Marijuana Like Wine Act of 2012, which 
did not garner enough signatures to make it onto the ballot.71 That Act 
stipulated: “State taxes and regulations which may be similar and 
apply to the grape farming and wine industries . . . shall apply to 
marijuana.”72 There are so many ways of defining “equivalent” that it 
is hard to determine what that would have meant in practice, had the 
provision become law. 
Thus, the seemingly technical question of the appropriate basis of 
cannabis taxation turns out to implicate substantial issues of value 
	
67 Id. 
68 Chaloupka et al., supra note 64, at 174. 
69 Suzanne Daley, Hungary Tries a Dash of Taxes to Promote Healthier Eating Habits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/europe/hungary    
-experiments-with-food-tax-to-coax-healthier-habits.html?pagewanted=all. 
70 Marijuana smokers typically attempt to regulate how “high” they become by 
smoking some amount, waiting, and then judging whether the dose already taken is 
sufficient; if not, another “hit” is taken. The slow onset of intoxication when cannabis is 
administered through the gut rather than the lung complicates this effort. 
71 Oglesby, supra note 28, at 255–56, 268. 
72 Regulate Marijuana Like Wine: A California Voter Initiative—2012, INITIATIVE 
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://regulatemarijuanalikewine.com/regulate-marijuana-like-wine-act     
-2012/. 
CAULKINS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  1:47 PM 
1056 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 1041 
because the choice of basis generates incentive effects that will in turn 
importantly shape the market. 
F. Who Would Be Taxed? 
Both Colorado’s Amendment 64 and Washington’s I-502 
differentiate among growers, processors/manufacturers, and retail 
stores.73 This raises the question of whom to tax? Taxing further up 
the chain would be simpler since there would likely be fewer 
producers than stores, and production would be more rooted—
literally—to a location.74 
Taxing growers evades the sticky question of whether to tax 
marijuana in edibles at a higher or lower rate than plain marijuana by 
imposing the tax before the form is determined. A downside of 
simplicity is forfeiting the nuances of fine-grain tax structures that 
nudge consumers toward less dangerous forms. 
There is also the consideration of taxing a product that is illegally 
diverted to other jurisdictions. We know from tobacco-tax-evasion 
schemes that diversion occurs at all levels of the distribution chain.75 
For example, many cigarette packages discarded in Chicago, which 
has high state and local cigarette taxes, bear tax stamps indicating 
they were purchased out of state.76 If marijuana “leaks” out of the 
regulated distribution system after the stage at which taxes are 
collected, then the home jurisdictions can derive revenue from sales 
to customers in other jurisdictions. Illegal production will yield no tax 
revenue in any case. Resale of material aggregated from large 
numbers of small legal retail (“smurf”) purchases will pay full tax 
wherever the tax is collected. However, if the leakage occurs between 
(legal, licensed) production and retail sale, then the “exporting” 
jurisdiction would prefer to assess taxes further up the distribution 
chain. 
	
73 COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16; Washington Initiative 502, No. 63-502, Reg. Sess. (Nov. 
6, 2012). 
74 Taxing producers and distributors hides the tax from the public, and it could be 
argued that this would increase political acceptability albeit possibly forfeiting some 
power to alter consumer behavior. A rational economic analysis might dismiss that 
argument: the customer ultimately pays the tax, just in the form of higher prices. But 
appearances might matter. Alcohol and tobacco excise taxes are assessed upstream, and so 
do not show up on the customer’s receipt the way a sales tax does. 
75 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, passim. 
76 David Merriman, The Micro-Geography of Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Littered 
Cigarette Packs in Chicago, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, May 2010, at 61, 62–63. 
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Indeed, one can even imagine smuggling between states in both of 
which marijuana is legal, as now happens with cigarettes. Suppose the 
pre-tax retail cost of marijuana after legalization is $100 per ounce, or 
roughly one-third to one-half of its current value. With Colorado’s 
possible tax of fifteen percent of the wholesale value, the price to the 
consumer might be about $110.77 With Washington’s three different 
twenty-five percent levies at various market levels, the price to the 
consumer could easily be $150 per ounce. Indeed, the Washington 
State Department of Revenue estimated the price would be double 
that.78 Someone who gathered ten pounds in Colorado, drove it to 
Washington and sold it there could net $6,400,79 which would more 
than cover the cost of gas, hotels, and time. Thus the design of tax 
regimes needs to be mindful of risks and modes of evasion, or the 
sums actually collected will fall far short of those nominally assessed. 
G. Interaction with Medical Marijuana 
A particular question concerning what and whom to tax pertains to 
marijuana sold under medical-marijuana laws. As mentioned earlier, 
some jurisdictions are already collecting medical-marijuana specific 
levies (e.g., the city of Oakland, California); yet other laws 
specifically exempt medical marijuana from taxation (e.g., Colorado’s 
Amendment 64).80 This raises the question of medical marijuana’s 
market share if both medical and non-medical marijuana are sold 
side-by-side with comparable legal status. 
If medical availability were limited to those with the serious 
diseases often mentioned by advocates, the medical system would 
pose only very limited competition for the non-medical market and 
therefore could be ignored in computing potential tax revenues. 
Studies of those obtaining medical recommendations in California 
suggest that only a small proportion have HIV/AIDS, cancer, 
glaucoma, or other serious diseases.81 The majority of patients 
	
77 Colorado is now considering adding also an ad valorem retail tax, perhaps on the 
order of twenty-five percent. 
78 See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., supra note 23, at 27–28. 
79 10 pounds * 16 ounces per pound * ($150 – $110) per ounce = $6,400. 
80 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16. 
81 Helen Nunberg et al., An Analysis of Applicants Presenting to a Medical Marijuana 
Specialty Practice in California, 4 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 12 (2011), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=rosalie_pacula; see 
Thomas J. O’Connell & Ché B. Bou-Matar, Long Term Marijuana Users Seeking Medical 
Cannabis in California (2001–2007), HARM REDUCTION J., Nov. 3, 2007, at 1, 5–6 
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seeking medical-marijuana recommendations were for hard-to-verify 
ailments such as lower-back pain, insomnia, and anxiety.82 
Thus, it is possible that legal availability for non-medical use might 
“peel off” the bulk of the current medical dispensary buyers. 
However, if marijuana sold under medical recommendation were 
untaxed (or taxed at a lower rate than marijuana sold to the general 
public) and if taxes in the general system were high—as they would 
have to be in order to maintain anything resembling current 
prices83—then current consumers of medically recommended 
marijuana (and perhaps additional consumers as well) might choose 
to get medical recommendations to avoid taxation. That might not 
make financial sense for low-volume users if the cost of obtaining the 
recommendation exceeded their tax savings. But it would make good 
sense for any daily or more-than-daily user, and that group—albeit a 
minority of all users—consumes the bulk of all marijuana and 
provides the bulk of all the revenues of the marijuana industry.84 
Such a pattern of a market dominated by its heavy users is 
consistent with the existing pattern of alcohol consumption, and there 
is no reason to doubt that it would change under marijuana 
legalization. Even a very large number of new casual users would not 
suffice to change it, because a single, four-gram-per day heavy user 
consumes more marijuana than a hundred people, each of whom 
shares a joint a week with another person. Therefore, unless the rules 
on medical availability are tightened, or unless the tax differential is 
modest, any estimate of tax revenues needs to take account of 
competition from the medical marijuana market. 
H. What is the “Optimal” Excise Tax? 
Any tax structure will have to balance the various sometimes-
conflicting goals of legalization, including: 
1. Maximizing tax revenues, 
2. Battling the black market and violence by those involved in 
the drug trade, 
3. Limiting the increase in marijuana abuse and dependency, 
	
(2007), available at http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-4          
-16.pdf. 
82 Nunberg et al., supra note 81, at 11–12. 
83 See Part I.C for a discussion of this argument. 
84 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 24–25. 
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4. Minimizing the use of particularly risky and unhealthy forms 
of marijuana, 
5. Limiting gray-market tax evasion, and 
6. Minimizing the cost and complication of enforcing the 
marijuana tax structure. 
The different types of taxes outlined above create different 
incentives for producers and consumers. Markets respond to price 
incentives, including those created by taxes, as the tobacco examples 
cited above make clear.85 For example, one might predict the market 
to respond to specific excise taxes (i.e., per unit weight taxes) by 
creating higher potency products, and to ad valorem taxes by selling 
in bulk or as a loss-leader that induces customers to purchase other 
goods that are not subject to the marijuana-specific tax.86 Hence, the 
relative appeal of the different taxing schemes depends on which of 
these various goals are judged to be the most important. So the 
optimal tax depends on the observers’ values, but Tables 1 and 2 
summarize some “armchair” or deductive analyses of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the tax choices outlined above. 
  
	
85 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, passim. 
86 KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 16. 
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TABLE 1: HYPOTHESIZED CONSEQUENCES OF VARIOUS MARIJUANA TAX 
STRATEGIES BY TAX TYPE 
 
By Total Weight Ad Valorem 
By Amount of 
Intoxicant (e.g., 
THC, or THC to 
CBD ratio) 
Production 
Effects 
Favors high 
value-to-weight 
production 
methods (e.g., 
organic, hand-
crafted) 
Favors low-cost 
production 
methods 
Requires quality 
control and 
labeling 
Marijuana 
Type Effects 
Incentivizes high-
potency 
marijuana 
Creates 
incentives for 
using marijuana 
as a loss-leader if 
imposed at the 
retail level 
Can incentivize 
less potent and 
potentially less 
risky forms of 
marijuana 
Tax Structure 
Complexity 
Simple except for 
edibles and need 
to index for 
inflation 
Simple Complex, 
particularly if 
distinguish by 
type of 
cannabinoid; 
testing may not be 
accurate enough 
Examples 
CA Ammiano 
Bill (2009)87 
Proposed Rhode 
Island Bill 
(2013)88 
Colorado 
Amendment 64 
Washington I-502 
Hawaii’s Bill 
(2013)89 
Massachusetts 
House Bill 1371 
 
 
  
	
87 AB 390 Assembly Bill Status, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0351-
0400/ab_390_bill_20100209_status.html. 
88 Marijuana Regulation, Control, and Taxation Act, H. 2013-5274, Jan. Sess., at 1 (R.I. 
2013), available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText/BillText13 /HouseText13 
/H5274.pdf. 
89 H. 27-699, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Haw. 2013), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov 
/session2013/bills/HB699_.pdf. 
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TABLE 2: HYPOTHESIZED CONSEQUENCES OF VARIOUS MARIJUANA TAX 
STRATEGIES BY TAX TARGET 
 
Growers/Producers Retailers 
Revenue Effects Relatively less revenue 
since marijuana is taxed 
early in the production 
chain and does not tax 
added value of marijuana-
infused products 
Potentially get to tax value 
of other products sold in a 
“bundle” with the 
marijuana (e.g., 
marijuana-infused edibles) 
Black Market 
Effects 
Fewer taxpayers to 
monitor 
Incentivizes tax evasion 
between grower/producer 
and retailer (leakage) 
Transparency Generally hidden from 
consumer 
Tax is transparent to 
consumer 
Marijuana Type 
Effects 
May be harder to tax 
based on potency 
Allows for cannabinoid-
based taxation 
Tax Structure 
Complexity 
Can be simple Can be complex, 
particularly if distinguish 
by type of cannabinoid 
Examples Colorado Amendment 64 
Washington I-502 
Washington I-502 
II 
ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
To date, most analysis has emphasized revenues from excise taxes, 
and sometimes from conventional sales taxes, on sales to consumers 
in the legalizing jurisdiction. However, there are other potential 
sources of tax revenue. 
A. Licensing Fees 
Most proposals to regulate the marijuana industry include some 
form of licensing of producers, manufacturers, and stores, with 
associated licensing fees. Fees are typically modest, perhaps intended 
to cover only the administrative cost of processing the applications 
and other costs of maintaining a regulatory regime. For example, 
Washington I-502’s fee is $1,000 per year for a producer.90 If I-502’s 
	
90 Washington Initiative 502, No. 63-502, Reg. Sess. (Nov. 6, 2012). 
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three-tiered excise-tax structure ended up producing tax revenue of 
fifty dollars per ounce, that means the producers’ license fee would 
vanish into irrelevance by comparison if production volumes were in 
the thousands, or even hundreds, of pounds per licensee. 
This does not imply that fee revenue has to be negligible, 
especially in a big state. In California, the Alcohol Beverage 
Commission is funded through license fees and has an annual budget 
of about $50 million.91 Also, as was noted above in Part I, section D, 
states could limit the number of licenses enough to drive up their 
market value, and then auction them to the highest bidder—a scheme 
that has a variety of benefits to the public, but not to the producers. 
B. Drug Tourists 
If one jurisdiction legalizes and others do not, drug tourism can 
develop in which users in the “dry” state visit a “wet” state to 
purchase marijuana. This has been an issue in the Netherlands and in 
discussions in the United States.92 Indeed, some Dutch localities, 
interested in drug-tourism revenues, are planning to fight a national 
ban on the sale of marijuana to tourists.93 
It is perhaps worth distinguishing three categories of drug tourists: 
day-trippers, destination tourists, and what might be called “tip-the-
scalers.” The first, day-trippers, are those who take short excursions 
for the purpose of purchasing marijuana. Of all the states, Colorado 
and Washington are among the worst positioned to take advantage of 
this sort of tourism because relatively few people reside within 250 
miles of their borders. As shown in Figure 1, day-tripping might be 
much more significant if a state on the eastern seaboard, such as 
Connecticut or Maryland, legalized marijuana. 
	
91 Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, ALLGOV.COM, http://www.allgov.com 
/usa/ca/departments/business-transportation-and-housing-agency/department-of-alcoholic-
beverage-control?agencyid=49 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
92 David Jolly, Amsterdam Shops Selling Marijuana to Stay Open, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/world/europe/amsterdam-mayor-says              
-cannabis-coffee-shops-will-remain-open.html?_r=0; BARBARA BROHL & JACK FINLAW, 
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64: REGULATION OF 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 50 (2013), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms 
/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf. 
93 Jolly, supra note 92; Paul Ames, Haze Clears Over Dutch Cannabis Law, 
GLOBALPOST (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe 
/benelux/130110/netherlands-amsterdam-cannabis-law-coffee-shops-marijuana. 
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FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MARIJUANA USERS WITHIN A 100-, 250-, 
AND 500-MILE RADIUS OF COLORADO, WASHINGTON, AND 
CONNECTICUT94 
 
The second are destination tourists who organize a trip around 
marijuana activities, but those activities go beyond the practical 
aspects of purchasing product. Seattle’s Hempfest draws hundreds of 
thousands of people, not just for product sales, but also for an array of 
vendors, music, and activities. Similarly, for example, people visit 
Napa Valley’s wineries for an overall experience and not just to 
obtain better deals on wine. 
The third involves people who take a trip motivated by another 
objective, but for which the legalizing state beats out a competitor 
state—that is, tips the scale—because legal marijuana is viewed as an 
amenity. For example, suppose snowboarders from the East Coast 
travel to Vail, Colorado instead of Park City, Utah because they could 
	
94 These data is derived from substate estimates of past month users from the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2008–2010. 2008–2010 NSDUH Substate Estimates of 
Substance Use and Mental Disorders, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/substate2k10/toc.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013). This chart does not account for the possibility that legalization might increase 
marijuana initiation in neighboring states due to price decreases or a change in social 
norms. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 15. 
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obtain marijuana legally in Vail. Under any of these scenarios, the 
state will capture tax revenues and other economic benefits from 
tourists’ spending on other goods and services, such as gasoline, 
restaurant meals, and lodging, in addition to taxes collected on the 
marijuana purchases. 
The importance of drug tourism will depend partially on the 
prevalence of these three different types of drug tourists. The 
Colorado Tourism Office reports that the tax revenues per tourist 
dollar spent vary due to differing local tax rates and types, but the 
average is about 5.5% per tourist.95 Hence, if a drug tourist spent 
$300 on meals, lodging, and other expenses for every $100 worth of 
marijuana purchased, the sales tax revenue on those ancillary 
purchases could exceed the excise plus sales-tax revenue from the 
marijuana sale.96 For Colorado tourists, per-visit spending varies from 
$1,000 for skiers down to $48 for day-trippers, with an average of 
$370.97 
Likewise, the importance of drug tourism depends on the number 
of tourists. Washington state and Colorado together have roughly six 
percent of the nation’s current marijuana users,98 so if even a modest 
share of users elsewhere obtained their marijuana directly or 
indirectly via drug tourism, the volume of sales via drug tourism 
might be significant compared to the volume of sales to in-state 
residents. 
	
95 See Callie Jones, Associate Director of Colorado Tourism Office John Ricks: 
Colorado Is Open for Business, J. ADVOCATE (June 28, 2012), http://www.journal-
advocate.com/sterling-local_news/ci_20964993/colorado-office-tourism-john-ricks-rotary-
club; see also LONGWOODS INT’L, COLORADO TRAVEL YEAR 2011: ONLINE REPORT—
JUNE, 2012 (2012), available at http://www.colorado.com/sites/colorado.com/files 
/ColoradoLongwoodsReport2011_3.pdf (prepared for the Colorado Tourism Office). 
96 If the wholesale price is two-thirds of the retail price, then Colorado’s fifteen percent 
wholesale excise tax is equivalent to a ten percent retail tax. So the total effective tax on 
retail marijuana sales would be about 15.5% versus 5.5% on non-marijuana purchases. 
97 LONGWOODS INT’L, supra note 95, at 25–26. 
98 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., STATE ESTIMATES OF SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL DISORDERS 
FROM THE 2009–2010 NATIONAL SURVEYS ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, app. A.9, app. 
B.3 (2012), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10State/NSDUHsae 
2010/NSDUHsaeCover2010.pdf. For 2009–2010 combined: Colorado: 465,600 past-
month users (11.29% * 4,124,003); Washington: 491,506 (8.86% * 5,547,471); Nation: 
17,108,963 (6.77% * 252,717,320); Washington and Colorado compared with the Nation: 
(465,600 + 491,506) / 17,108,963 = 5.6%. 
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C. FICA and Income Taxes on “New” Jobs 
Another part of the marijuana industry that becomes taxable under 
legalization is the salaries of workers, who (unlike workers in illicit 
industries) pay income and payroll taxes. How important that is 
depends on the share of wages in total costs. In many industries, labor 
costs predominate. If that were true also for the new marijuana 
industry, payroll taxes might be roughly comparable to excise-tax 
revenues in Colorado. To see why, suppose, for example, the 
proportion of the retail sales price that comes from paying wages is 
the same as the wholesale price as a proportion of retail. Then, 
suppose that wholesale prices are two-thirds of retail prices, and two-
thirds of the marijuana industry’s cost structure comes from wages. 
Since the FICA rate is 15.3%, counting the employer’s half,99 it 
would produce essentially the same revenue as a fifteen percent 
excise tax on the wholesale value. Ironically, that would be revenue to 
the federal government, not to the state that legalized. That said, states 
could also collect income taxes on marijuana-industry wages; for 
example, 4.63% in Colorado. 
D. Hosting Support Industry 
Even if most of the marijuana industry’s cost structure will come 
from labor, it will also purchase capital equipment (e.g., grow lights), 
materials (e.g., growing medium), utilities (e.g., electricity), and 
professional services (e.g., legal counsel). Many of those purchases 
will generate sales-tax revenue, and they may also sustain a local 
ancillary industry, just as auto-assembly plants sustain a supply chain 
of parts suppliers. 
Furthermore, what the marijuana industry spends locally on wages 
and equipment becomes income for others in the state, which triggers 
additional spending. Economic development studies discuss this 
additional spending in terms of a “multiplier effect” of hosting an 
industry. For example, Gazel explains this effect for casino 
gambling.100 In this context, the marijuana industry creates an initial 
round of economic activity through the purchase of equipment, 
	
99 FICA and SECA Tax Rates, U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact 
/progdata/taxRates.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2012). 
100 See generally Ricardo Gazel, The Economic Impacts of Casino Gambling at the 
State and Local Levels, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66 (1998) (suggesting 
that monopolistic oligopolistic market structures cause economic losses in states that allow 
casinos). 
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materials, utilities, and professional services (“direct effects”). Those 
businesses in turn buy the goods and services they need, creating 
another round of spending, and so on (“indirect effects”). Further, as 
incomes of regional employees in these industries rise, household 
spending increases (“induced effects”). To the extent that these 
expenditures stay in a legalizing state and do not “leak” out, each 
dollar spent on the marijuana industry will have an additional impact 
on the economy and revenues as spending ripples through the 
economy. 
E. Consumer Cost Savings 
If legalizing marijuana drives down prices, then marijuana 
spending may decline as well, since demand for marijuana may be 
sufficiently price inelastic101 so as to offset non-price factors through 
which legalization might promote greater use.102 If so, legalization 
could act a bit like a technological innovation that increases consumer 
welfare and frees money up for other uses. 
Suppose that, for the sake of argument, before legalization, 
consumers were spending $30 billion on marijuana and paying no 
sales tax on those expenditures. Suppose further that after 
legalization, use went up but prices fell enough to reduce spending to 
$20 billion. The discussion above in Part I considered the potential 
sales tax revenue on the $20 billion, but what of the residual $10 
billion? Unless total personal income shrinks (via some 
macroeconomic contraction from increased production efficiency 
displacing workers), it seems plausible that some of that $10 billion 
might be spent on other goods and services that would be taxed. 
F. Alcohol Tax Revenue 
Whether or not marijuana legalization turns out to be a net good or 
a net bad for society may depend on how it influences the 
consumption of alcohol.103 While heavy marijuana use can impose 
costs on users, their intimates, and society, these costs generally pale 
	
101 Total demand elasticity may be on the order of -0.5. Gallet, supra note 34, at 3; 
Pacula, supra note 34, at 5. Pacula’s review suggests a participation elasticity close to -0.3 
and a total demand elasticity close to -0.5 (good information on total demand elasticity for 
marijuana does not exist; the latter was calculated using the ratio of total demand elasticity 
to participation elasticity for alcohol and tobacco). Gallet’s meta-analysis also suggests a 
participation elasticity close to -0.3. 
102 See KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 16. 
103 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 30, at 134. 
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in comparison to the social costs associated with heavy drinking. 
However, there is no scientific consensus about whether marijuana 
and alcohol are economic substitutes or complements.104 And even if 
there were, it is not clear whether that research would be applicable in 
a post-legalization environment. If marijuana legalization leads to a 
significant increase in marijuana consumption, this could affect 
alcohol consumption, which in turn would affect the tax revenues 
from alcohol.105 A comprehensive revenue analysis would need to 
consider this and other indirect effects mediated through changes in 
consumption of other goods. 
CONCLUSION 
Various jurisdictions have decided to legalize large-scale 
production and distribution of marijuana or are contemplating that 
action. The potential for tax revenues is a perennial consideration, but 
the discussions have yet to fully grapple with the implications of 
potential price declines, gaps in prices between jurisdictions, and the 
ability of markets to adapt in response to such price signals. The 
discussion above suggests that jurisdictions legalizing marijuana face 
a few fundamental choices. First, will production and distribution be 
controlled by a government monopoly? That scenario offers 
compelling advantages in terms of potential government revenue and 
protection of public health, but seems unlikely in the United States, 
where legalization is being pioneered by states acting in defiance of 
an ongoing federal prohibition by means of extra-legislative ballot 
initiatives. 
Second, if production and distribution will be the province of a 
regulated private industry, will tax rates be set high enough to offset 
the anticipated sharp declines in production cost? If taxes are left at 
modest levels (say less than fifty percent of the new, lower retail price 
or less than twenty-five dollars per ounce), then it is possible that tax 
evasion will be no more than a nuisance. But if this is the case, tax 
revenues are not likely to reach the aspirations of some who promote 
legalization. Indeed, revenues from associated taxes, such as FICA 
and state income taxes on workers’ wages and sales taxes on drug 
tourists’ purchases of things other than marijuana, that have received 
much less attention, could be comparably important. 
	
104 KILMER ET AL., supra note 20, at 42–43. 
105 One could also make a similar argument about tobacco. 
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On the other hand, if taxes are set high enough to prevent 
substantial price declines (say $100 per ounce or more), then the 
overall legalization regime might need to be designed around the 
objective of thwarting tax evasion. If the regime is not designed this 
way, those nominally high taxes may prove uncollectable and 
legalization will end up converting a black market into a gray market, 
rather than eradicating illegal markets altogether. 
This Article has attempted to broaden discussions of the revenue 
implications of marijuana legalization, but by no means has exhausted 
the range of potential implications. For example, there might be 
effects on productivity and employment in either direction—negative 
effects if consumption and abuse of marijuana increased or positive if 
falling marijuana arrests led to fewer people’s resumes being 
tarnished by a criminal record. There could likewise be positive or 
negative effects if marijuana legalization affected abuse of other 
substances that are in turn related to labor market outcomes. 
In summary, jurisdictions seeking to generate revenue from legal 
marijuana confront a number of difficult choices. These decisions will 
not only influence state budgets, but also illegal revenues as well as 
the amount and types of marijuana that are consumed. Given how 
little we know about the effects of different cannabinoids and how 
legalization will actually play out, especially with respect to alcohol 
consumption and the federal response, at this point it may make sense 
to think of revenue regimes for legal marijuana as learning 
experiments rather than permanent fixtures and, as Oglesby argues, to 
design nimbleness into marijuana tax systems.106 
 
	
106 Oglesby, supra note 55, at 262. 
